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The argument for and against the application of peaceful nuclear
energy in Saudi Arabia is discussed in terms of the country's
industrial development and power requirement for electricity and
desalination. The discussion leads to the conclusion that due to
its large oil reserve, Saudi Arabia may tolerate a considerate
approach to nuclear energy up to the year 2000. Beyond this date,
nuclear energy should be used in order to achieve the desired
industrial maturity in the country. The introduction of nuclear
energy, however, will befaced with three constraints, namely (in
decending order of importance) man power availability, cooling
water requirement, and the size of the electrical grid. The period
1980-2000 is thus most suitable for important preparation steps,
among which are the adoption of regulatory provisions,
establishment of nuclear facilities withnecessary equipments, and
staff training for regulatory, organizational, and technical
activities. The paper outlines a scheme for the initiation steps
and efforts to meet these requirements.
11
Friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie in Saudi-Arabien: Bewertung und
Empfehlung
KurzfassuQg
Die Argumente für und gegen die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie
in Saudi-Arabien werden unter Berücksichtigung der industriellen
Entwicklung des Landes und seines Energiebedarfs für die Strom-
erzeugung und die Meerwasserentsalzung diskutiert. Die Schluß-
folgerung lautet, daß Saudi-Arabien aufgrund seiner großen Ölvor-
kommen zulassen könnte, daß das Land bis zum Jahre 2000 in wohl-
überlegter Weise den Weg in Richtung Kernenergie einschlägt. Nach
diesem Zeitpunkt sollte die Kernenergie eingesetzt werden, um das
Land zu der gewünschten industriellen Reife zu bringen. Der Ein-
führung der Kernenergie stehen jedoch drei Einschränkungen gegen-
über, nämlich (in der Reihenfolge ihrer Bedeutung) Verfügbarkeit
von Arbeitskräften, Bedarf an Kühlwasser und Umfang des Strom-
netzes. Aus diesem Grund ist der Zeitraum von 1980 - 2000 für
wichtige vorbereitende Schritte sehr geeignet. Dazu gehören der
Erlaß von Durchführungsbestimmungen, die Errichtung von kern-
technischen Forschungsanlagen und deren notwendige apparative Aus-
rüstung, die Ausbildung der Mitarbeiter zur Ausarbeitung von
Sicherheitsvorschriften, sowie für organisatorische und technische
AUfgaben. Der Beitrag gibt ein Schema für die einleitenden
Schritte und Bemühungen, die erforderlich sind, um die genannten
Anforderungen zu erfüllen.
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1. How U~gent is NUGlea~ Powe~ to Saudi A~abia ?
It is Gonvenient to state that Saudi A~abia is not in irrunediate
need of nucleap powe~ fo~ anumbe~ of ~easons, among which a~e:
(1) This count~y has gigantic pet~oleum ~ese~ves, as known to
eve~y one.
(2) Its local consumption of elect~icity is ~athep modest.
(3) When using nuclea~ fuels, the lack of horne-made technology can
~esult in high dependency on fo~eign supplie~s and may even
end up subjecting the count~y's powep system to oscillations
of policies that may take place in the supplie~'s count~y.
Howeve~, this.is only one face of the coin. Its othep face can be
demonst~ated as foliows:
1.1 Keeping Pace with the F~ee Wo~ld
In Saudi A~abia the indust~ial, ag~icultu~al, and economical
development of the count~y is founded on close technological
pa~tne~ship with USA, Japan, and the leading count~ies in Weste~n
Eu~ope. Likewise, the development of the powe~ indust~y in the
count~y must be seen within the f~ame of this same pa~tne~ship.
That is, the planning fo~ the g~owth of the powe~ indust~y in the
count~y should be in co~~elation with the diffe~ent elect~icity
p~oduction tendencies now going on in these count~ies.
In most of the technological pa~tne~ count~ies of Saudi A~abia,
e.g. F~ance, Ge~many, Japan, USA, etc., the sha~e of nucleap powe~
in elect~icity p~oduction is steadily g~owing, ~ega~dless of the
seve~al detestations suffe~ed by the nuclea~ indust~y in these
count~ies f~om time to time.
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Keeping pace with this elect~icity p~oduction tendency in the
supplie~ count~ies will be the most st~aight way to follow.
Othe~wise, in the long run the country will be faced with
technological and economical bu~dens in case if lt ehooses to
support and maintain on its own its traditional power system
(based on oil and gas) which is to some extent diminishing in the
supplier countries.
1.2 The Three Fronts of Petroleum
The petroleum reserve in Saudi Arabia is explored on 3 fronts:
(A) As the main sou~ce for foreign eur~eney: Through exporting
erude 011 the eountry's eeonomic and social deve10pment a~e
finaneed.
(B) As the prineiple means fo~ national ineome dive~sifieation:
There is an o~ganized effort f~om the government of Saudi
Arabia to expedite the development of the country in the best
systematie way, the 5-yea~ development plans. These sta~ted in
1970, henee two plans have been al ready implemented. The thi~d
one is on the verge of execution. The development target is to
dive~sify the national income by means of industriallzation in
the first plaee. However, the potential industries for the
next eouple of decades are of the ene~gy intensive type (e.g.
refinaries, pet~ochemica1s, fertilizer industries, aluminum,
steel making, ete) whieh are mostly dependent on petroleum as
the p~imary ~aw material.
(C) As the maln energy resouree for implementing the development
program.
1.3 Expansion in Eleetrieity Consumption
The argument that the loeal eonsumption of eleetricity is modest
does not hold firm any more. While in 1975 the total installed
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capacity was only 1256 MWe, it reached in 1980 around 5000 MWe.
According to a study performed recently /1/, the installed
capacity will expand five folds during 1980-2000.
1.4 Additional Energy Market
In Saudi Arabia, there is another remarkably fast growing market
for thermal heat, namely desalination. Large desalination plants
are now in operation on the west and east coasts. As of 1980,
planned total capacity is around 600 thousand m3 per day or
desalted water. Accordingly the consumption per capita is nearly
0.3 m3 per day. By the year 2000, this value will lift up to
around 1 m3 per day, whereas the expansion in desalination
capacity can reach up to 5 million m3 per day /1/.
This means, the demand for thermal input for desalination
requirement (at the rate of 610 Btu per gallon of product water
/2/) will be in the year 2000 nearly 8 times that in 1980.
The energy component cost makes up a substantial component of the
desalted water cost /3/. It is then quite obvious that energy
expenditure for desalination will constitute in the year 2000 a
substantial part of the total energy bill. Thus with respect to
desalination there is a high incentive for searching new
alternatives of energy.
1.5 Reactor Centered Industrial Complexes
Industrial siting in the country is planned in the form of
industrial complexes which can benefit from common energy supply
sources. The necessary infrastructures are already erected to a
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la~ge extent at two of such complexes, namely the Jubail
indust~ial complex on the Gulf, some 90 km f~om Dammam, and the
Yunbu indust~ial complex on the Red Sea.
Planned indust~ies in these complexes a~e of the ene~gy intensive
type. Fo~ example, planned indust~ies in Jubail incIude agas
gathe~ing plant, a steel mill, an aluminum smelte~, two ~efina~ies
fo~ expo~t of pet~oleum p~oducts and th~ee pet~ochemical
complexes.
In addition to such la~ge complexes, smalle~ indust~ial estates
a~e also g~owing at the main cities in the count~y. In this case
the p~ivate secto~ is pa~ticularly active in cement manufacturing,
fIourmilling, food and beverage products, clothing, furniture,
pape~, plastics, and chemical products.
Both industrial complexes and indust~ial estates requi~e
permanent, ~eliable, and more important inexpensive energy supply
source.
The nuclea~ power ~eactors which a~e fueled in most cases once
annually a~e in position to provide the requi~ed various types of
steam (e.g. injection, extraction, process steam), beside pure
water, and of-cou~se elect~icity. Fo~ example, an advanced type of
~eactor such as Fast B~eede~ Reacto~ (FBR) and High Temperature
Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR) can p~ovide a refinary with hot gas or
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1.6 Reactor for Mining
Saudi Arabia is also endowed with vast mineral deposits. Rich
veins of iron are found at several locations. Four million tons of
70 %iron ore together with 25 million tons 45 %ore and at least
a 1000 million tons with a lower iron content has been already
identified.
The substantial deposits recorded in the Arabian Shield suggest
that this area could become the richest mining sector in the
world. The deposits and their locations are shown in Figure 1.
The exploitation of these deposits and those in the Red Sea thus
constitutes still a further future energy market in the country.
As all industrial products in the country, the exploitation of the
local minerals also must withstand the severe world market's
competition. Lower energy expense is one effective measure to
minimize production cost.
In this respect, the application of nuclear reactors to mining
will be particularly advantageous due to the inherent feature of
nuclear energy which tends to stablize the price per kilowatt-
hour.
Generally in an oil power station, the cost of the fuel accounts
for two thirds of the generating cost. This proportion will hold
true even in Saudi Arabia' if the calculation considers fuel
transportation cost involving some 1200 km, from the oil fields
located in the far East to the mining sites in the far West.
On the other hand, in a nuclear power reactor (e.g. Light Water
Reactor, LWR) , the cost of the fuel accounts for only one-fifth
(using the plutonium recycling fueling option) of the gene rating
cost. This cost, in turn, is made of a number of cost factors,
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namely cost of: natural uranium, enrichment, processing and
manufacturing of fuel and fuel assemblies, and waste management.
Furthermore, the afore mentioned cost factors are completely
independent of each other. Thus, unless prices of all items
increase sUbstantially and simultaneously, power generating cost
will remain relatively insensative to price fluctuation in one or
two items.
1.7 Tentative Conclusion
Having stated briefly the pros and cons, a conclusion may be made
with respect to nuclear power in Saudi Arabia. We are of the
opinion that this country may tolerate the absence of nuclear
power up to the year 2000 but not much far beyond that.
In the vicinity of the year 2000, the first sign of industrial
maturity will emerge. One backbone support of it, as planned now,
will be the achievement of the required size of skilled man power.
However prior to reach such a level of industrial maturity it will
be somewhat a compulsory measure to decelerate the governmental
subsidizies which are now received by all production sec tors in
different forms and scales.
With respect to energy gene rating sectors the end effect of the
gradual displacement of subsidizies will be to grade up the low
fuel prices used nowadays to the scale of the oil export price. At
point of time when this will happen (most likely in the vicinity
of the year 2000), it is then the real impact of the fuel price on
electricity and fresh water production that will surface and the
need, as experienced internationally, for new energy alternatives
will be realized.
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Undoubtedly, solar energy will be one natural alternative energy
source to petroleum in Saudi Arabia, a country with much solar
assets /4/. Saudi Arabia's researches in the field of solar
technology is in progress. But whether large scale solar power
production will pass the threshold of the commercial viability
during the next 25 years remains questionable. On the other hand,
the most advanced nuclear fission reactor, namely the Liquid Metal
Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) will be commercially feasible in
Europe as early as 1990 /5, 6/.
Let us keep in mind that the natural evolution of the power system
in a country 1s thought to progress in phases: near term phase
based on conventional energy supp11es (e.g. petroleum, hydro, and
coal), transition phase based on fission nuclear power, and far
future phase based on fusion or solar energy.
Due to the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia on one hand, and its high
solar potentiality on the other hand, some observers tend to think
that it may be possible for this country from the resource point
of view to circumvent the transition phase by stretching the time
scale of the near term (based mainly on petroleum) up to the
threshold of the commercial feasibility of solar energy or fusion.
But the effort for stretching the near term phase will place the
country in two predicaments:
First, the country's power system will remain static for at least
20-30 years to come which can jeopardize the achievement of an
industrial maturity in the country through imposing the need for
burning the readily available energy commodity (but more liable to
become much expensive in the long run), namely petroleum, than
consuming the less expensive one, nuclear fuel.
Second, during this static or freezing period of the power system,
the country's experience in the field of nuclear power will remain
completely absent. The set back in this case would be rather
- 8 -
severe if the country, say in the year 2000, will reach the
conclusion that its power system cannot rely entirely on solar
energy but rather on a combined system consisting of both solar
and nuclear energy.
Moreover, turning the face to nuclear power in the year 2000 or
2010 would require still another 20 years or so to build up the
necessary man power for executing a nuclear power program. During
this period, again, the burden on petroleum as the principle
energy resource will continue.
Thus, a 50 years petroleum based power system must be accounted
for in case if Saudi Arabia does not plan to integrate nuclear
power plants in the vicinity of the year 2000.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that while there is no such an
urgent need for nuclear power during 1980-2000, this period is
most conducive for an organized effort to conceive a nuclear
vision and start preparing the required local staff of nuclear
energy specialists.
2. Constraints Concerning the Introduction of Nuclear Power
In almost all developing countries, electricity is generated by
small unit sizes. The electrical grids, if there are any, in these
countries are not large enough for integrating nuclear power
plants of the economical unit sizes, namely in the range of
500-1300 MWe.
- 9 -
The electricity generation in Saudi Arabia has been traditionally
based on small units owned and operated by private companies but
regulated and supervised by the government. A survey carried out
by the Ministry of Central Planning (MCP) revealed that the total
number of the electrical units in the country amounted in 1975 to
261 units having the total installed capacity of only 1256 MWe
/7/ .
Most of these small units were not interconnected. However, the
planners realized that since electricity generating capacity was
forcasted to reach in 1980 four times that in 1975, establishing
integrated system will be most advantageous concerning the
technical, man power, and investment requirements. Interconnection
will result in both an organized distribution of electricity and
the elimination of smaller units. It was made clear (in 1975) that
to meet the electricity generation requirement in 1980 (i.e. 5335
MWe) the total number of units would be 204 (on the average of
20-30 MWe) for an integrated system compared to 560 (on the
average of 10 MWe) units for nonintegrated system. Since then the
governmental effort to establish interconnected grids were greatly
intensified.
The planners conceived the erection of 3 national grids as shown
in Figure 2. The largest is the one to serve both the eastern and
the central parts of the country. As foreseen now, by 1990 these
grids will be weIl established and it is possible that by the year
2000 they will be interconnected, forming one large national grid
served by few modern power stations.
Since 1970, the Desalination Organization (DO) has emerged as a
"production-partner" to the electricity companies. Desalination at
many locations means in principle the dual production of
electricity and fresh water. Table (1) shows the dual production
planned capacity up to 1980. It reveals that electrical units of
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200 and 500 MWe are al ready planned for integration. Hence, it
seems logical to state that in future times small unit sizes will
gradually disappear.
This means, in turn, what is seen now to constitute a high
constraint, namely the small grid size, will not be actually of
great worries in the future and especially at times of the
introduction of nuclear power to the country, e.g. in the vicinity
of the year 2000.
But Saudi Arabia is still faced with two main constraints; the
first is due to lack of water for cooling and the second is due to
having low population.
2.1 Constraint Concerning Cooling Requirement
Saudi Arabia is a large country, having the total area of 2149 690
km2 . This country was born without a single river. Average
rainfall is less than 101.6 mrn/y, except at the highland regions
of the South-West where it can be up to 304.8 mrn/y /8/.
Underground water resources are abundant but only at certain
locations.
The seas, the Red Sea in the West and the Gu1f in the East, are
now referred to for desallnation and for cooling all systems that
need to be cooled. Similarly, the first few nuclear power plants
will be located on shores and cooled directly by sea water.
On the other hand, inland siting of nuclear power plants will be
necessary for a number of reasons, among which is coupling of a
reactor to mining industries at locations within the Arabian
Shield. In this case, the highest constraint will be attributed to
the requirement of large quantities of water for condenser
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eoo1ing. In fact, the applieation of wet eooling towe~ far inland
siting is just not p~aetieal on the aecount that a large
P~essu~ized Water Reaeto~ (PWR) station (e.g. 1300 MWe) ope~ating
unde~ the Saudi dese~t eondition will ~equi~e dai1y over 100
thollsand m3 as make up wate~ supply /1/. This is a t~emendous
amount of water fo~ a desert loeation.
The only remaining alternative fo~ all inland siting will be then
the app1ieation of d~y eooling towe~s. Compa~ed to wet eooling,
eooling with a d~y tower imposes two penalitiesj a higher eost
penality and a penality due to lower plant the~ma1 effieieney. To
eompensate, ~eaeto~s with higher effieieneies than wate~ ~eaeto~s,
e.g. HTGR, FBR, will have to be eonsidered in the long run fo~
inland sitings.
2.2 Const~aint Coneerning Man Power
Compared to its large a~ea and vast bounda~ies, the total
population in Saudi A~abia is rathe~ low. In the stati-
stieal indieator of the eount~y issued in 1977, the 1974 eensus
appea~ed to be 7.01 million /9/.
Available man power, both skilIed and unskilled, ~uns always in
sho~tage of the demand. It was foreeasted that the demand fo~
unskilled manpowe~ will ine~ease du~ing 1975-1980 f~om 304,000 to
446,000 while the available unskilled wo~ke~ in 1980 will be only
a~ound 296,000. During the same pe~iod, the demand fo~ skilIed
labo~ will inerease f~om 1,218,000 to 1,865,000. Thanks to
voeational t~aining eente~s in the eount~y, the available ski lIed
labo~ in 1980 will be around 1,100,000 /7/.
Due to such limits on skilIed and unskilled man powe~, eertain
neeessa~y and appropriate measures have been taken in the eount~y
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in o~de~ to ensu~e that fo~eign wo~ke~s can be obtained and
~etained in sufficient numbe~s to meet development ~equi~ements.
The~efo~e, unlike in many pa~ts of the wo~ld, fo~eign wo~ke~s in
Saudi A~abia a~e highly paid. This high payment policy is an
app~op~iate measu~e fo~ the time being. But if it extended to a
longe~ pe~iod than necessa~y, it definetly leads to high
p~oduction costs in the count~y which in tu~n can weaken the
competetiveness of the local p~oducts with those impo~ted.
In ~ecognition of the needs fo~ t~ained, skilled, and
well-educated Saudi citizens, the development of man powe~
occupies the highest p~io~ity in the count~y. So has been always
the policy and p~actice since the ea~ly time of establishing the
Minist~y of Education, headed o~iginally by the C~own P~ince Fahd
Ibn Abdulaziz.
The late King Faisal decla~ed "We continue to d~1l1 wells fo~
wate~ and oil, but most impo~tant is the weIl of knowledge". The
Saudi gove~nment kept this committment always alive; as much as 25
%of the national bUdget is now allocated fo~ education.
Science, enginee~ing, and ~elated subjects a~e tought in 4
unive~sities in the count~y. Vocational t~aining is ca~~ied out
independently of the fo~mal education. Quite a numbe~ of
vocational cente~s a~e established th~oughout the count~y to cate~
fo~ indust~ial and se~vice needs. The t~aining p~og~am cove~s
indust~ial induction, c~aft upg~ading, on the job t~aining, and
inst~ucto~ t~aining. In addition, the Saudi gove~nment spa~es no
effo~t in p~oviding education ab~oad. A la~ge numbe~ of Saudis a~e
~eceiving highe~ education and job t~aining at seve~al qualified
educational and vocational institutions in USA and weste~n Eu~ope.
Howeve~, it must be ~eminded that the development ta~get in the
count~y is to dive~sify the national income. Fo~ this pa~ticula~
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reason, there are well defined priorities for which the available
man power must be enlisted. This means, unlike many of the highly
populated developing countries, in Saudi Arabia there 1s no
surplus of college graduates and trained technicions that can be
diverted for the purpose of in nuclear energy.
We should emphasize, however, that Saudi Arabia, as a late coming
country, needs not to be engaged heavily in nuclear researches but
rather make benefit of the technology which has been al ready
developed in industrialized count ries. We are convinced that most
of the technological partner count ries to Saudi Arabia will be
willing to extend, through the concerned international agreements,
the sound technology they have developed for peaceful application
of nuclear energy.
This, however, does not mean that there should be no research
efforts in Saudi Arabia. In reality, there are several problem
which are particular to the region. To mention one, the appli-
cation of nuclear reactors for desalination is not yet a reality
in the free world. Hence, the technology of coupling a
desalination plant to the cold end of the nuclear power station
could be a task that Saudi Arabia could help to develop.
In the duel production case, the reactor is the heat source and
the desalination plant is the heat sink. Thus, the shut down of
one end will result in loss of the two products simultaneously.
The question is: How high is the availability of a dual production
station? These problems and other similar ones are not of much
concern to developed countries; they, admittedly, could be best
solved only by experienced inhabitants of the region.
Nuclear energy is one area where as many as possible native
scientists and engineers must be involved. This field covers a
wide spectrum of industries. If planned correctly, flow of
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teehnology to the eountpy ean be aehieved in papalell to the
epeetion of a peaetop fpom its eaply eoneeption.
Planning for the transfep of nuelear teehnology ean be best
aeeomplished by a loeal group of multidiseiplinapy ehapaetep,
being fully awape of the eountry's assets and limits and having
full aeeess to its pegulatory ehannels.
Admittedly, it is quite true that eonsultanee sepviee fpom abpoad
ean be always obtained. But the point to emphasize is that without
having a loeal "nueleap intelligence" there will be only a loose
link between the loeal industpies and the newly eoming nueleap
enepgy with its multilatepal teehnology, as has been seen too
often the ease in the past.
3. Reeommendation Coneepning Initiation Steps fop Developing
Man Powep
In the following we state oup opinion about how to proeeed. Thepe
ape two faetors to eonsidep:
(1) The advent of nueleap powep is envisaged in the vieinity of
the yeap 2000.
(2) There ape high priorities for diverting human pesoupees to
apeas othep than the field of nueleap energy, eoupled with a
somewhat tight availability of man powep in general.
Viewing fpom these two faetors, the initiation steps to build up
duping the next 20 yeaps the (minimum) pequired loeal man power
ape now diseussed.
In the first plaee, a "nueleus" fop the future nueleap enepgy
opganization must be established as eaply as possible. Let us eall
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this "nucleus" as the Committee for' Atomic Ener'gy Pr'omotion,
abbr'eviated as (CAEP).
At its infancy, the CAEP should compr'ise at minimum of ten
scientific member's guided by a council in legislation and
administr'ation. The scientific major's of the CAEP member's, mostly
r'equir'ed on master' and Ph.D. levels, should include: Nuclear' Eng.,
Mechanical Eng., Electr'ical Eng., Industr'ial Eng. (Planning), and
Chemistr'Y and Physics.
The scope of the CAEP will be associated with the following
r'esponsibilities as ar'r'anged in descending or'der' of pr'ior'ity:
Fir'st: Lay down the fundamentals for' enabling the adoption of the
r'equir'ed nuclear' legislations for' the pr'otection of pUblic health
and safety and the envir'onrnent fr'om adver'se impact which can
r'esult fr'om peaceful application of nuclear' ener'gy.
Legislation and r'egulator'y pr'ovisons ar'e weIl established in many
countr'ies which, together' with the advisor'Y ser'vice of the IAEA,
are willing to cooperate with all developing countr'ies at request.
In this r'espect, the main task of the CAEP will be to r'eview
several nuclear r'egulations which are enfor'ced at different
countries, select the most pr'oper' provisions, identify areas of
modification, and submit to the guiding council for' adoption in
accordance to the country~s legislative and administr'ative
patterns.
Whether the country will soon embar'k on a nuclear progr'am or not,
radioisotopes will be applied independently fr'om time to time by
specialists in medicine, ground water hydrology, industr'Y, etc ••
Whatever the scale of application is, there should be normal
r'adiation protection measures in the countr'Y. Thus, the CAEP
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should establish the means fo~ t~aining in Healt Physics. Pa~allel
to it, a health physic labo~ato~y should be established in the
count~y as ea~ly as possible.
Second: The CAEP next should dedicate itself to its most impo~tant
task, namely fo~mulating a p~og~am fo~ the peaceful application of
nuclea~ ene~gy in view of the tpansfe~ of nuclea~ technology to
the count~y.
Peaceful application of nucleap ene~gy is unde~stood th~oughout
the wo~ld la~gely in two te~ms, powe~ p~oduction and ~adioisotope
technology. Thanks to the initiation of P~esident Eisenhowe~,
details of technology in these two a~eas a~e well documented by
the IAEA, of which Saudi A~abia is a membe~ state.
To be able to d~aw a ~easonable p~og~am, the CAEP will have on one
hand to employ the se~vice of seve~al adiviso~y committees and on
the othe~ hand to acqui~e a consultance se~vice f~om competent
bodies f~om ab~oad. The p~ocedu~e should be in the following
sequences:
(1) Define the potential applicants of isotopes in both public and
p~ivate secto~s (including accedemic ~esea~ch cente~s)
(2) Review the powe~ system in the count~y (e.g. gene~ation
capacity, dist~ibution patte~n, man powe~, planned expansion,
etc.)
(3) Su~vey p~esent capacity of local indust~y and its planned
future expansion.
(4) Compile data in o~de~ to have a clear reflection of the extent
to which the count~y can benefit f~om introducing nuclear
technology in the course of time.
(5) Conceive a nuclear p~ogram and determine the extent of
technology t~ansfe~.
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Having conceived a nucleap ppogpam, the CAEP will be able to cast
light, to a lapge extent, on the necessapy (minimum) local man
powep pequiped fop the implementation of the ppogpam at its
diffepent stages.
The next step is that the CAEP should split itself into two bpoad
divisions; one which will gpow to the fopm of a Regulatopy Boapd
(RB) and the othep to the foprn of a Ppogparn Opganization Body
(POB). In this papticulap case, both divisions ape conceived to be
independent govepnrnental agencies eithep as self autonornous bodies
op joined undep a gpeatep govepnmental authopity as in the foprn of
an Atornic Enepgy Comrnission op so.
Concepning the stpuctupes of both the RB and POB, one cannot
advocate any existing pattepn, because they should peflect the
constitutional system and adrninistpative opganization of the
country. The size of each body will be propoptionally dependent on
the size of the program.
Concerning tasks and pesponsibilities, the RB will have to
deterrnine or adopt safety cpiteria and standapds, and will be
responsible for licensing, inspecting, and regulating the
constpuction and operation of all nucleap facilities that the
program calls for erection. The PO will be pesponsible for
implernentation of the nuclear program step by step, coupled with
the prepapation of the staff for ppoject Opganization, Ppoject
Opepation and Maintenance~
Concerning qualification of the RB and the supporting committees,
the end goal should be to achieve experienced and knowledgable


























Furthermore, since the implementation of the nuclear program will
require the POB to engage on large organizational activities, as
both to guarantee smooth transfer of technology and to prepare the
required technical staff as predetermined, staff recruiting should
look forward to experienced executives in all branches involving
the transfer of technology.
Finally, a word concerning the technical preparation of
specialists required by the Regulatory Body and those required for
implementing the nuclear program:
To start with, the technical preparation can be carried out at
selected research centers abroad along with teaching a carefully
designed curriculum in nuclear technology at one or two
universities in the country which should be especially equipped
with nuclear energy facilities. Timing here is particularly
sensative, because on one hand highly qualified staff must be
secured from the early stage of the program and on the other hand
too long a delay in implementation of the program will gradually
- 19 -
drain available qualified staff. An ideal case would.be to build
up man power in paralell to the step-wise implementation of the
program.
4. Summary
On the international seenery, resourees, eeonomieal, and
teehnologieal aspeets suggest that every eountry, at a point of
time or another, should eonsider nuelear power. Oil produeing
count ries are no exeeptions.
On the loeal seenery, the oil producer Saudi Arabia steps rapidly
toward industrialization with growing affinity for peaeeful uses
of nuelear energy in areas eoneerning:
Isotopes applieation in medieine, agrieulture, industry, ete.
Nuelear power produetion
Nuelear desalination
Nuelear proeess heat applieation
We have the eonfidenee that this highly stable middle eastern
eountry will be readily assissted by all IAEA members in
transferring the teehnology for peaeeful applieation of nuelear
energy.
However, on the aeeount of several interrelated issues (e.g.
eeonomie, teehnieal, health and safety, environmental, safeguards,
and liabilities), the eountry must not rely solelyon assistanees
reeeived from abroad but rather found a loeal group to eoneeive
the most eondueive steps for the transfer of teehnology. Only a
dedieated loeal group ean put up most serious efforts and eome out
with a elear-sighted nuelear program for the eountry.
- 20 -
Absence of local participation at times of defining the nuclear
program can simply inspire the consultant, or the "tutor" country,
to recommend a program based on extrapolation of experiences
gained from consultlng one or several developing countries. The
danger in this case is that too extensive a program, or the
converse, can be recommended, which may in the course of time run
into too many unforeseen serious difficulties which, in turn, may
lead the whole program to a dead end.
Also, trained and experienced local staff are highly desirable for
implementing the nuclear program and above all for regulating the
entire nuclear activities in the country in order to assure save
handling of radioactivity.
Fortunately, the country has sufficient lead time (e.g. the period
1980-2000) to prepare and train qualified staff to take up the
responsibility of framing and adopting a nuclear program and later
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Plant Capacity Year of Gross Inter. Product
Identification m 3/d Operation Electricity Electr. Ratio ::=
(10)3 Product Consump- WIE =
"[W(c) Hüll (m 3/d)/Kw(e)
"[W(e)
AL-Khobar Phase I 28.5 197~ 10 3.0 2.ß5
Al- Khoba r Phase II 190.00 1980 500 20 0.38
Khafj i Phase I 0.~55 1974 0.05
Khafj i Phase II 19.00 1979 50 2.0 0.38
Jubail Phase I 9.00 1977 25 0.9;) 0.38
Jubail Phase II 76.00 1979 200 8.0 0.38
Table 1:
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